lunes, 6 de abril de 2015

La verdadera historia de Pocahontas (History Chanel)



La princesa india Pocahontas se casa con el inglés John Rolfe.

05-04-1614
Durante su estancia en Henricus, Pocahontas conoció a John Rolfe y éste se enamoró de ella. El viudo de Rolfe, que había cultivado cierto éxito con una nueva variedad de tabaco en Virginia, tenía cierto recelo a casarse con una pagana como Pocahontas, por lo que escribió una carta al gobernador en la que pedía permiso para casarse con ella y que con su amor estaría salvando su alma. Lo que no sabemos es la opinión y los sentimientos que sentía Pocahontas hacia él. La boda tuvo lugar el 5 de abril de 1614 mediante el matrimonio católico y ella pasó a llamarse lady Rebecca. Vivieron felices en una de las plantaciones de él y el 30 de enero de 1615 nació Thomas Rolfe.


http://bo.tuhistory.com/hoy-en-la-historia/la-princesa-india-pocahontas-se-casa-con-el-ingles-john-rolfe

aybe If President Obama Had Sold Illegal Arms To Iran, Republicans Would Call Him A Hero

"If President Obama did some of the things Reagan and/or George W. Bush did while they were in office, Republicans would be absolutely losing their minds." Rachel Maddow fan page

Maybe If President Obama Had Sold Illegal Arms To Iran, Republicans Would Call Him A Hero

Read more at: http://www.forwardprogressives.com/maybe-president-obama-illegal-arms-iran-republicans-call-hero/


reagan-obama
http://www.forwardprogressives.com/maybe-president-obama-illegal-arms-iran-republicans-call-hero/

irancontra
http://www.forwardprogressives.com/talk-about-scandal-remember-when-conservative-hero-ronald-reagan-sold-illegal-arms-to-iran/
Talk About Scandal—Remember When Conservative Hero Ronald Reagan Sold Illegal Arms To Iran?

Read more at: http://www.forwardprogressives.com/talk-about-scandal-remember-when-conservative-hero-ronald-reagan-sold-illegal-arms-to-iran/
Talk About Scandal—Remember When Conservative Hero Ronald Reagan Sold Illegal Arms To Iran?

Read more at: http://www.forwardprogressives.com/talk-about-scandal-remember-when-conservative-hero-ronald-reagan-sold-illegal-arms-to-iran/
Talk About Scandal—Remember When Conservative Hero Ronald Reagan Sold Illegal Arms To Iran?

Read more at: http://www.forwardprogressives.com/talk-about-scandal-remember-when-conservative-hero-ronald-reagan-sold-illegal-arms-to-iran/
Maybe If President Obama Had Sold Illegal Arms To Iran, Republicans Would Call Him A Hero April 5, 2015 By Allen Clifton

Read more at: http://www.forwardprogressives.com/maybe-president-obama-illegal-arms-iran-republicans-call-hero/
Maybe If President Obama Had Sold Illegal Arms To Iran, Republicans Would Call Him A Hero April 5, 2015 By Allen Clifton

Read more at: http://www.forwardprogressives.com/maybe-president-obama-illegal-arms-iran-republicans-call-hero/
Maybe If President Obama Had Sold Illegal Arms To Iran, Republicans Would Call Him A Hero April 5, 2015 By Allen Clifton

Read more at: http://www.forwardprogressives.com/maybe-president-obama-illegal-arms-iran-republicans-call-hero/
Maybe If President Obama Had Sold Illegal Arms To Iran, Republicans Would Call Him A Hero April 5, 2015 By Allen Clifton

Read more at: http://www.forwardprogressives.com/maybe-president-obama-illegal-arms-iran-republicans-call-hero/

Erekat: Netanyahu wants Jewish state just like ISIS wants Islamic State

"Al-Baghdadi wants an Islamic State and Netanyahu wants a Jewish state, and his policy led to the burning of the boy, Mohammed Abu Khdeir, same as they burn people in Daesh."

Erekat: Netanyahu wants Jewish state just like ISIS wants Islamic State

Senior Palestinian official also says that Palestinian Authority already opened proceedings against Israel in ICC.

16:27 04.04.15


http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.650478?utm_source=Facebook&utm_campaign=Echobox&utm_medium=Social

FP: Misunderstanding wars in Yemen, Vietnam, and Yemen once again

Misunderstanding wars in Yemen, Vietnam, and Yemen once again

By Thomas E. Ricks

Misunderstanding wars in Yemen, Vietnam, and Yemen once again  

By J. Dana Stuster
Best Defense office of Arabian peninsula affairs
There’s an moment in the 2003 documentary The Fog of War in which former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara lays out what he got wrong in Vietnam. “We saw Vietnam as an element of the Cold War,” he says. “Not what they [the Vietnamese] saw it as: a civil war.”
I thought of that the other day as I listened to Adam Baron, a visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, talking about the Saudi intervention in Yemen. “This is treated as a sectarian battle between Iran-backed Shia and Saudi Arabia-backed Sunnis, but really when you look at the essence of Yemen’s problem, that’s not really it,” Baron told NPR. Iran actually has very little stake in the Yemeni Houthi rebels, which ousted the country’s transitional government from the capital in January and had been advancing toward Aden until the Saudis began airstrikes last week. The war in Yemen is a struggle between domestic forces: the Houthi rebels; the former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was ousted in 2011 and whose support has been essential to the Houthis’ success; the current nominal president, Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi; as well as a host of others, include a secessionist movement, Islamist politicians, and a branch of al-Qaeda looking to exploit any opening it finds.
Saudi Arabia has always seen Yemen as a weakness — a chink in its armor as it tries to maintain control of the Arabian Peninsula — and it has been vigilant about any opening to protect its sphere of influence. In a previous generation, Saudi Arabia intervened in Yemen to counter the influence of its then-rival Nasserist Egypt. Riyadh sees a similar threat to its peninsular hegemony in the influence of Iran among the Houthis.
That previous war was compared to Vietnam as well. Jesse Ferris, author of Nasser’s Gamble, a history of Egypt’s intervention, wrote on Wednesday that “the regional context is eerily familiar. First in Iraq, then in Syria and now in Yemen, the Saudis have watched with concern as Iran gains influence amid chaos.” Egypt poured soldiers and equipment into the country, escalating from an initial 20,000 troops to 70,000 between 1963 and 1967. What had been an intervention to support the late stages of a coup was bogged down by geopolitical struggle with Saudi Arabia. Hassan al-Amri, who as prime minister of Yemen was first supported, then ousted by his Egyptian supporters, complained in 1966 that Egypt “was more interested in pursuing its ambitions in South Arabia than in solving Yemen’s problems.”
Nasser’s chief general in the war, who was later found dead under suspicious circumstances, said of the campaign, “We did not bother to study the local, Arab and international implications or the political and military questions involved. After years of experience we realised that it was a war between tribes and that we entered it without knowing the nature of their land, their traditions and their ideas.” Egypt’s withdrawal, which coincided with the Six-Day War, marked the end of Nasser’s pan-Arabist ambitions. It was a stunning defeat for the country — some would eventually call it “Nasser’s Vietnam.” The comparison is apt. In The Fog of War, McNamara sounds much like Nasser’s humbled field marshal. “In the case of Vietnam, we didn’t know them well enough to empathize,” he says. “And there was a total misunderstanding as a result.”
Egypt should know better than to throw itself headlong into another proxy war in Yemen, but it has been a large supporter of the Saudi intervention. So far, it has deployed warships off the coast of Aden and President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi said he would be willing to authorize sending in ground troops.
In the 1960s, the United States had the good sense not to get mired in the war in Yemen. In fact, it was one of the few instances in which the United States did not intervene in some way to counteract creeping Soviet influence. (By then, Nasser was aligned with the Soviet Union, and he even brought the Yemeni president on a Red Sea cruise with Nikita Khrushchev in 1964.) U.S. Ambassador to Britain David Bruce cabled from London in 1968 in that the war was “of no concern to UK’s national interests, nor to U.S. interests… Since Roman days, every foreign power which intervened in Yemen got bogged down in morass of inter-tribal rivalries…If Sovs wanted ‘bases’ or other facilities in Yemen…they could pay the high financial price and take political risks required.” Even when the Yemeni government explicitly invited the United States to take over Egypt’s role as patron, Secretary of State Dean Rusk deferred. “While we sympathize [with] Yemeni republican leaders desire free themselves from [Egypt’s] embrace,” Rusk cabled in 1966, intervening would be a “desperate and extremely risky gamble.”
This time, the United States has thrown its weight behind the Saudi intervention. This extends far beyond the rhetorical support that has come from the White House and almost every corner of Congress — as Micah Zenko noted on Monday, the United States is providing live intelligence feeds to assist Saudi bombing operations. “Make no mistake,” he writes, “the United States is a combatant in this intervention.” This U.S. support comes despite the fact that almost every single Middle East expert writing about Yemen thinks the intervention is questionable at best, and probably a dangerous mistake. As do many Yemenis.
The Saudis have miscalculated and the United States is enabling its recklessness. The Saudi intervention will inevitably push the Houthis closer to Iran — which, despite press reports and Saudi paranoia, has relatively little stake in the rebels. It will also turn Yemenis against Saudi Arabia. There have been large protests against the strikes, which have hit civilian targets including an internally displaced persons camp and a milk factory. The blockade of the country threatens to create food shortages and a humanitarian crisis — some Yemenis are already fleeing to Somalia. “We will all be Houthis if troops come to our country,” a shop owner in the capital city of Sanaa told Yemeni activist Farea al-Muslimi. “This is our home and no one is allowed to break into it.” Saudi Arabia and Egypt still don’t understand the battlefield in which they are fighting.
The United States needs to look for a way to deescalate this before these trends become irreversible. That means looking for opportunities to start negotiations, possibly with Oman — which has stayed out of the Saudi intervention and is providing humanitarian aid — as a mediator. To the extent that the United States continues to participate in military operations, it should be doing its best to rein in the Saudis. As Brookings’ Kenneth Pollack wrote last week, “This is one of those situations where the United States needs to restrain its allies for their own good.” If the parties can come to the negotiating table soon, there is a small chance that this could possibly be the crisis necessary to restart Yemen’s stalled political transition process. The window for any favorable outcome, though, will close quickly — and may have closed already. The Saudis and the United States need to consider the consequences: Are they ready to accept the consequences of turning another civil war into a Cold War proxy?
Dana Stuster is a policy analyst at the National Security Network and a retired researcher for Tom Ricks, as seen in The Generals.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/06/misunderstanding-wars-in-yemen-vietnam-and-yemen-once-again/?utm_content=bufferb0d53&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer

Exclusive: Rwanda Revisited


Exclusive: Rwanda Revisited


Exclusive: Rwanda Revisited


EXCLUSIVE
Former President Clinton said he never knew the full extent of suffering during Rwanda's genocide. But U.S. diplomats knew exactly what was happening -- and they warned Washington.

n March 25, 1998, President Bill Clinton expressed regret for failing to halt genocide in Rwanda, saying that he didn’t “fully appreciate the depth and the speed with which [Rwandans] were being engulfed by this unimaginable terror.”
But U.S. officials in Rwanda had been warned more than a year before the 1994 slaughter began that Hutu extremists were contemplating the extermination of ethnic Tutsis, according to a review panel’s newly released transcript and declassified State Department documents obtained by Foreign Policy from the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.
An August 1992 diplomatic cable to Washington, written by Joyce Leader, the U.S. Embassy’s deputy chief of mission in Kigali, cited warnings that Hutu extremists with links to Rwanda’s ruling party were believed to be advocating the extermination of ethnic Tutsis. On the morning the killing began in April 1994, there was little doubt about what was happening in Rwanda.
“We had a very good sense of what was taking place,” Leader told an unprecedented 2014 gathering of former Rwandan officials and international policymakers who managed the response to the world’s worst mass murder since the Holocaust. “It was clear that a systematic killing of Tutsi was taking place in neighborhoods.”
Senior ethnic Hutu officials who favored reconciling with Tutsi rebels refused to join forces with the extremists carrying out the genocide and were also hunted down and murdered, she said.
Leader’s cable was part of the discussion of a three-day review last year sponsored by the Holocaust Museum’s Center for the Prevention of Genocide and The Hague Institute for Global Justice. A transcript of the review’s findings — which runs more than 240 pages long, plus a 32-page executive summary — was provided to FP ahead of its public release at 11am on Monday, April 6, the 21st anniversary of the start of the Rwandan genocide.
The event provided an extraordinary opportunity for 40 key players and observers to review the missteps. They included former Rwandan government and rebel officials; Belgian, French Rwandan, and U.N. diplomats and peacekeepers; aid workers, journalists, scholars, and Security Council ambassadors. U.S. officials who were directly involved in the United States delivered a detailed insider account of the American response.
Clinton’s envoys in Rwanda were clear-eyed about the nature of what was unfolding in the hours and days following the April 6, 1994, shoot-down of a plane carrying Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana and his Burundian counterpart, according to the review’s transcript. That set the stage for the mass slaughter of nearly a million ethnic Tutsi Rwandans, and some moderate Hutus, by extremists among the country’s majority-Hutu population.
As the killing began, terrified Rwandans fled their homes for safety, to the grounds of U.S. Ambassador David Rawson’s residence. At one stage, a small child seeking protection in the ambassador’s backyard was shot and killed, Leader recalled.
She also warned her neighbor, Rwandan Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, who wanted to seek refuge at the American diplomat’s home, to steer clear for fear that the Presidential Guard, who were implicated in the killing, would come looking for her there. Uwilingiyimana was murdered a day after the killing began.
The 2014 discussions, which took place from June 1 through June 3, tracked the doomed Rwandan peace process, known as the Arusha Accords, which were signed in 1993 and were designed to end civil war between a Hutu-dominated government and a Tutsi-led insurgency based out of Uganda.
The attendees identified plenty of culprits: Extremists within the Hutu-led government who sought to sabotage peace efforts. Rwandan rebels who launched a massive offensive in northern Rwanda a year before the genocide, swelling the ranks of Rwanda’s community of displaced and providing a breeding ground for radicalized recruits who carried out ethnic slaughter of Tutsis. International diplomats who clung to false hopes that a doomed peace process could reverse Rwanda’s slide from a civil war.
Even the very notion of democracy came up for criticism, with Leader noting that “we need to acknowledge the link between violence and promotion of change, or democracy and peace in the case of Rwanda. We should acknowledge the negative consequences that result in some cases from the promotion of democratization.”
Britain’s then-U.N. ambassador, David Hannay, broke the failure into two parts: what he called “sins of commission” and “sins of omission.”
“The sins of commission were mainly the work of the Rwandans themselves,” he said.
“It is true that we were abandoned. But we abandoned our people, and massacred our own people,” Jean-Marie Vianney Ndagijimana, Rwanda’s ambassador to Paris during the genocide, said during the review. “Primary responsibility for the genocide, and the crimes that accompanied it, must be borne by us, Rwandans. We must accept that fact before we make accusations against the international community.”
The indifference of outside powers, particularly the United States, was a central theme of the talks.
A lot of the criticism centered on the fact that the U.N. and other world powers failed to respond to a clear warning, issued in January 1994, that a plan for the extermination of the Tutsi was underway.
The contents of that cable, drafted by the U.N.’s Canadian force commander, Lt. Gen. Roméo Dallaire, were never shared with the U.N. Security Council.
But the U.N.’s top officials in Rwanda shared the cable’s contents with representatives of the United States, Britain, and Belgium.
“I never knew about the genocide fax. I am not sure my colleagues in the African affairs bureau knew about it,” said John Shattuck, the then-U.S. assistant secretary of state for labor, human rights, and democracy. “Had this fax become more widely known in the U.S. government, it would have provided ammunition for those who were trying to resist” efforts to constrain U.N. peacekeeping.
“I do think the genocide fax could have made a difference to those like myself who were trying to impact on the debate,” he added.
But Dallaire, who attended the conference, cut Shattuck off.
“I must rebut rapidly. President Clinton did not want to know,” he said. “I hold Clinton accountable. He can excuse himself as much as he wants to the Rwandans, but he established a policy that he did not want to know.”
Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Prudence Bushnell reinforced the view that top policymakers in the Clinton administration paid little attention to events in Rwanda leading up to the genocide.
“I was way down the totem pole and I had responsibility for the Rwanda portfolio,” she recalled. “That shows you how important it was in the U.S. government.”
Indeed, there had been other warnings that had been ignored or missed. As far back as August 1992, Leader wrote a cable to Washington citing local concerns that an extremist political party linked to President Habyarimana was pursuing a “Ku Klux Klan-like approach to ethnic relations” that was “widely interpreted as a call for the extermination of Tutsis.”
In August 1993, Bacre Waly Ndiaye, a U.N. human rights researcher from Senegal, produced a troubling report about the prospects of genocide. And on Feb. 25, 1994, following a visit to Rwanda by Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes, the Belgian Foreign Ministry sent instructions to its United Nations envoy to explore how to strengthen the U.N. peacekeeping mission.
That document cited the “possibility of genocide in Rwanda…. It will be inacceptable for Belgians to be passive witnesses to genocide in Rwanda.”
On April 6, the day the Rwandan and Burundian leaders’ plane was shot down, French President François Mitterrand walked into the office of his foreign affairs advisor, Hubert Védrine, and asked: “Have you heard? It is terrible. They are going to massacre each other.”
U.N. officials and diplomats in New York said at the review that they were unaware of the reports. Iqbal Riza, a retired U.N. official who oversaw Rwanda for the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping, and Colin Keating, a New Zealand diplomat who served as the president of the U.N. Security Council, said they were unaware of the Ndiaye report.
The U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, meanwhile, never provided the U.N. Security Council with a briefing of Dallaire’s troubling cable.
The backdrop for America’s lack of interest in Rwanda went back to the end of the Cold War, when then-Secretary of State James Baker sought cuts in the State Department to fund the establishment of more than a dozen new embassies in the former Soviet Union, Bushnell recalled. The Africa bureau in the State Department saw its budget shrink. Clinton also showed little interest in Africa.
“Early in the Clinton term, I was not able to get a new, democratically elected president in Africa, a former human rights activist, to see the president because, I was told, ‘President Clinton would find him boring,’” Bushnell said.
The one initiative that sought considerable engagement was Somalia, where President George H.W. Bush had authorized the deployment of U.S. Marines to pave the way for a massive humanitarian relief effort. Clinton inherited the operation, which gradually entangled American military forces in a war with Somali militia challenging the international presence.
The Oct. 3, 1993, the deaths of 18 U.S. soldiers in a botched raid in Mogadishu put the Clinton administration on the defensive, and cooled the Pentagon’s attitude toward U.N. peacekeeping.
As the genocide unfolded in Rwanda six months later, the White House was finalizing a presidential directive, known as PDD-25, which placed severe constraints on the conditions required for U.S. support for peacekeeping missions. President Clinton, meanwhile, was preoccupied with producing a health care bill and upcoming midterm congressional elections — and was determined to keep America out of any foreign military entanglements, said Shattuck.
“It was effectively a straitjacket for U.S. decision-making, vis-a-vis various kinds of peacekeeping operations,” said Shattuck. “In a sense, PDD-25 was the U.S. equivalent of the withdrawal of Belgian forces after the killing of the peacekeepers, in the sense that it gave a ‘green light’ to the genocide planners.”
Even after the killing began, the White House was focused more on getting Americans and the U.N. out of Rwanda than coming to the aid of Rwanda’s victims.
Thomas S. Blanton, the director of the National Security Archive, who moderated the 2014 discussion, said that a review of declassified State Department cables and logs of a task force set up to handle the crisis showed that 80 percent of the discussion in the United States concerned the evacuation of American citizens.
Most of the remaining 20 percent was about convincing the warring parties to abide by a cease-fire and resume talks on a power-sharing agreement, Blanton said.
The White House focus on protecting civilians was largely limited to one individual, a Rwandan human rights activist named Monique Mujawamariya, who had met with President Clinton in the White House in December 1993, several months before the genocide began.
“Oh my god, all hell is breaking loose, and I am getting phone calls, ‘Where’s Monique?’” Bushnell recalled. “The greatest pressure from the White House during the entire Rwandan affair was finding Monique.” Mujawamariya fled Kigali in one of the last flights by foreigners out of the country.
The U.S. military, meanwhile, showed little interest.
The Defense Department “did not want to spend money,” Bushnell recalled. “I used to call them the ‘nowhere, no how, no way, and not with our toys’ boys.”
“Boy, oh boy, did the shooting down of the plane on April 6 and the withdrawal of the Belgians give us the excuse we need to pull the plug,” she said. “It was an unfortunate period in my government’s history. I regret it greatly, as I think all of us do.”
The U.N. peacekeeping mission was woefully unprepared for the violence, and Rwandan government troops killed 10 Belgian peacekeepers.
During an initial visit to Rwanda in August 1993, Dallaire had recommended a force of 8,000 peacekeepers to oversee a tenuous peace process. The U.N. peacekeeping department shrunk that number down to 5,000, before the U.N. Security Council cut it in half, leaving a force of about 2,400 on the ground when the violence started.
“I was instructed that this mission had to be on the cheap,” Dallaire recalled. “The Americans had not paid [their U.N. dues], there was no money, and nobody was particularly interested in the mission to start with.”
When the genocide began, the United States launched a diplomatic campaign aimed at bringing the U.N. peacekeepers home. Initially, Washington sought to shutter the mission entirely. On April 15, 1994, Edward Walker Jr., then the U.S. deputy permanent representative to the U.N., relayed instructions from Washington to withdraw the entire U.N. mission.
But later that day, Nigerian U.N. Ambassador Ibrahim Gambari and Hannay, the British U.N. envoy, convinced Walker’s boss, then-U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Madeleine Albright, to change her position.
“You simply cannot do that,” Hannay recalled telling Albright. “The idea that we should simply withdraw the troops and leave these people to be murdered was not right. It won’t do.”
Albright agreed, and called Richard Clarke, the senior director on the U.S. National Security Council, to change her instructions. The United States reversed itself. On April 20, the council adopted a resolution providing a minimal presence of 270 peacekeepers.
Inside Rwanda, the United States, France, and Belgium were fielding desperate appeals from Rwandans to maintain a diplomatic presence there. Dallaire said more than 1,000 elite foreign troops were mobilized to evacuate foreigners from Rwanda during the genocide. He appealed to Belgian and French commanders “to modify their orders to let me establish a force that would stop the massacres of threatened people, particularly in Kigali.”
“The answer was a categorical no,” Dallaire said.
Védrine, Mitterrand’s foreign affairs advisor, said he was unaware of Dallaire’s request, and “in hindsight, perhaps we can say this was a huge pity.” In late June, France ultimately did send troops into Rwanda in an intervention mission that undoubtedly saved lives. But it also faced criticism for protecting the fleeing forces of the Rwandan army, a longtime ally whose most extremist elements orchestrated the killings.
The Pentagon explored plans to set up a peacekeeping force outside of Rwanda, to protect refugees crossing the border. The proposal was dismissed by other Security Council members as a “joke,” recalled Hannay, noting that people were being killed inside Rwanda.
Col. Leonidas Rusatira, the head of the military college in Rwanda, appealed to U.S. and European diplomats to stay. “He said our presence would help calm the situation,” Leader recalled. “I had to be very firm and say, ‘These are our orders, we are leaving, please help us get out safely.’”
Back in Washington, Bushnell said she heard that U.S. Marines who were stationed in Burundi were eager to enter Rwanda to help evacuate Americans.
They wanted to go, but I was on the phone with my colleagues, saying, ‘No, no, no, no, do not leave the airport in Burundi,’” Bushnell said. “The last thing I wanted was somebody in Burundi shooting down an American helicopter.”
Instead, she arranged the Americans’ evacuation by land across the border.
“I do not apologize for that. The first obligation of a government is to its citizens,” Bushnell said.
“We were terrified of what was going to happen to our citizenry and so indeed we went into action,” she said. “…We had no concept that we would not be going back and not helping. I regret my government’s actions with regards to the citizens of Rwanda. I do not regret my government’s actions with regards to the citizens of the United States.”
Gen. Henry Anyidoho, a Ghanaian officer who served as the second-highest ranking U.N.  peacekeeper in Rwanda, said the diplomatic community’s departure from Rwanda “affected us very badly.”
“They left too early,” Anyidoho said. “Once the killers knew there was no referee, they had a free hand to do whatever they wanted. We were overwhelmed by the effort of saving lives.”
“We felt abandoned,” Anyidoho said.
The 2014 review, which was organized with the help of the National Security Archives, was modeled on the group’s oral history series, which has previously brought key figures like former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, Cuban leader Fidel Castro, and Russian generals to discuss the Cuban Missile Crisis.
The new documents add to a collection of more than 2,000 declassified U.S., U.N., French, and Belgian cables about the Rwandan genocide. Additionally, the group plans to declassify cables from the White House in the coming days.


https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/05/rwanda-revisited-genocide-united-states-state-department/?utm_content=bufferad1af&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer